What is the Irish government's Brexit wish-list? The proposition that Irish unity, equally opposed to safeguarding political and economic stability, is the foremost concern of the Irish regime is to misunderstand and misrepresent the motivations of this key Brexit stakeholder, writesMary C. Murphy.

Following the U.k. vote in favour of Leave, the Irish gaelic regime moved swiftly to identify its priorities for the Brexit negotiation period. These included: minimising the impact on merchandise and the Irish economic system; protecting the Northern Republic of ireland peace process; maintaining the Common Travel Surface area; and influencing the future of the Eu.

In mitigating the risks to the peace procedure, the Irish government has been explicit in its desire to avoid a hard border on the isle of Ireland, to protect the Belfast/Good Friday Agreement, and to support continued northward-south cooperation. Simultaneously, the Irish gaelic government wishes to maintain close trade between the UK and European union/Ireland and to minimise the regulatory burden for goods transiting the U.k.. To achieve these twin objectives – no hard edge on the island of Ireland and no barriers to merchandise between the UK and Ireland – Taoiseach Leo Varadkar favours the U.k. staying in the community union and unmarried market. However, in the absenteeism of such a prospect, the Irish government supports the inclusion of the backstop in the Withdrawal Agreement. It is envisaged every bit an insurance policy in the absence of alternative solutions.

In welcoming the draft Withdrawal Understanding, the Taoiseach stated: 'The text makes clear that this backstop would apply "unless and until" a better solution is agreed. I firmly hope that we can achieve that improve solution, and volition be working strenuously to that end'. The Irish regime's support for the backstop is a pragmatic rather than a political position – a means to maintain existing practices and atmospheric condition on the island of Ireland as set out by the Belfast/Good Fri Agreement if other options do not materialise.

For Northern Ireland unionists however, it is non the Irish gaelic government's stated position which is problematic, but the mode in which that position is framed. When Strange Minister Simon Coveney talks almost achieving a united Ireland 'in my political lifetime', this is met with alarm past a unionist community which has long felt vulnerable and besieged. Unionists were similarly dismayed when Taoiseach Leo Varadkar promised nationalists in Northern Ireland that 'You will never again exist left behind by an Irish government'. The unionist response to these pronouncements is to question the motivations of the Irish gaelic government, and to perceive a link between the aspiration for Irish unity and the Irish government'southward policy on Brexit. In reality even so, there is little show to propose that the Irish government is angling to attain Irish gaelic unity via Brexit.

There are no policy documents, no public consultations, no Dáil debates, no civil guild movements and no media sources actively agitating for a united Ireland. Notably, in that location is besides a reluctance among Irish gaelic political parties to enter a coalition government (or a confidence and supply arrangement) with Sinn Féin, the party about wedded to future Irish unity.

The priority issue for the Irish gaelic government is navigating Brexit in a manner which protects Irish economic interests, the peace process and the Belfast/Practiced Friday Understanding. In that location is unwavering commitment to the terms and spirit of the Agreement which includes provision for Irish unity by consent just. In that location is niggling appetite among the main Irish political parties for a discussion of Irish unity at this time, and perchance more significantly, in the longer-term, at that place is no inevitability about the effect of any such referendum in the Democracy of Ireland. A recent RTÉ/BBC poll demonstrated that although 62 per cent of Northern Ireland voters perceive that Brexit increases the likelihood of a united Ireland, just 35 per cent of Irish voters experience likewise.

Moreover, unionists should not be fatalistic in their assessment. Talk of Irish gaelic unity, or even the belongings of a border poll, does not presuppose the achievement of Irish unification. In fact, a border poll may feasibly copper-fasten Northern Ireland's constitutional status when the many political, economic, social and cultural dimensions of a new Ireland are examined in depth. The assumption of majority support for Irish unity – amid voters North and Due south – is by no means a given, especially when information technology is existence elicited in a political vacuum where discussion of detail and logistics is completely absent.

Let'due south be clear, all Irish governments accept aspired to Irish gaelic unity. However, for the electric current Irish authorities, achieving the least confusing Brexit is its highest priority. Other debates, unexpected crises and new priorities volition no doubt materialise in the longer-term, only for now stability and the status quo take precedence, and talk of Irish gaelic unity simply does not adjust to that agenda.

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Note: The above was originally published on LSE Brexit.

About the Author

Mary C. Murphy is Lecturer in the Department of Regime & Politics at the University College Cork.

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